In mid-1997, after starting the Certificate of Legal Practice (CLP) course at the University of Malaya, I ran up against one of my earliest frustrations with the criminal legal procedure in Malaysia: the prima facie stage of a criminal trial.
The saga begins with an interpretation of the previous incarnation of section 180 of the Criminal Procedure Code (CPC), titled Procedure after conclusion of case for prosecution, which read as follows:
When the case for the prosecution is concluded the Court, if finds that no case against the accused has been made out which if unrebutted would warrant his conviction shall record an order of acquittal, or if it does not so find, shall call on the accused to enter on his defence. [Emphasis mine]
Until 1996, the landmark case laying down the interpretation of section 180 PC was Haw Tua Tau v PP [1983] 1 CLJ (Rep) 11. It was decided by the Privy Council from a case emanating from Singapore. Haw Tua Tau essentially affirmed that notwithstanding amendments to the CPC, the prima facie stage test followed the traditional common law approach.
In Haw Tua Tau, the Court confirmed that the test at the prima facie stage was hypothetical. The judge should ask if the prosecution’s evidence was accepted as true, would it establish each essential element of the charge? It more a question of law and fact, but with more law than fact. Consequentially, at the prima facie stage, the judge is supposed to take a minimum evaluation of the evidence. At this stage, the judge does not need to be convinced that the evidence proves beyond a reasonable doubt that the accused is committed the offence.
Instead, the judge must determine whether there is some evidence that, if believed, would warrant a conviction. That hypothetical belief can be dispensed with if the evidence is inherently incredible—that is, not credible to the point that its very description defies belief. For example, a witness testified he saw the accused enter an apartment on the twentieth floor through its window and was deposited there by a twenty-story tall fire-breathing monster.
The court decides whether the prosecution has proven the charge beyond a reasonable doubt only after the defence is called and heard. Until then, the judge must keep an open mind. Practically, she is supposed only to make up her mind after she has heard the evidence and read arguments from the respective parties.
The Privy Council in Haw Tua Tau summed up the traditional common law approach to the standard of proof at the close of the prosecution’s case, an approach followed by the rest of the Commonwealth.
The Federal Court, in the decision of Arulpragasan Sandaraju v Public Prosecutor [1996] 4 CLJ 597, however, decisively rejected Haw Tua Tau and, with that, the traditional common law approach. It affirmed exactly what the Privy Council rejected: that the prosecution must prove its case beyond a reasonable doubt (BRD) at the prima facie stage. It held that the court must undertake a maximum evaluation of the prosecution’s evidence at the prima facie stage. That same high standard of proof is applied throughout the trial.
I could understand why the local criminal lawyers were arguing for this to be the position—it placed a much heavier burden on the prosecution to prove its case BRD at an intermediate stage. The logic is that since the prosecution is made weightier during its phase of the case, the defence is less likely to be called.
Having read, considered, and synthesised all the important decisions about the test at the prima facie stage, beginning with Haw Tua Tau and ending with Arulpragasan Sandaraju, I accumulated a deep disquiet with how we ended up with the latter case, which I thoroughly disagreed with.
That disquiet was informed by Tuan Syed Ahmad Idid Syed Abdullah Idid infamous Understanding the Judiciary Notes, specifically UTJ Note No. 13. In this note he wrote about the late Edgar Joseph Jr and in his second paragraph this is what he wrote:
Edgar will then write … and several of his decisions are off the mark. He criticised HAW TUA TAU but went on a bingo of his own… and as a result our Malaysian judgments are now suspect. He did this merely to spite his other Malaysian Federal Court brother -judges like Tan Sri Azmi who was in favour of the old decision. When Edgar made the new law his aim was to ridicule the other Fed Court panels but now it is evident that England, Brunei and Singapore Courts cannot accept Edgar’s decision in Koo Hii Chiang which is bad law! So Edgar and all other Judges, BEFORE YOU DECIDE kindly make sure you research deeply into the facts and the actual/relevant laws. Don’t let personal feelings play any role. AND REMEMBER: OUR NATION MALAYSIA MUST COME FIRST. DECIDE WISELY SO THAT OTHER JUDGES AND PEOPLES OF OTHER COUNTRIES CAN RESPECT SUCH DECISIONS.’
How true his statement is, I don’t know. However, having read the important Supreme Court and Federal Court decisions leading up to Arulpragasan Sandaraju, his observations about there being a schism between Tan Sri Azmi and Tan Sri Edgard Joseph is not without basis. The clear difference in approach, attitude and frustrations between them was palpable from their judgments. Also, Tuan Syed Ahmad Idid’s observation about the other Commonwealth countries not following Arulpragasan Sandaraju is correct.
Aside from the genesis of the change in law from Haw Tua Tau to Arulpragasan Sandaraju, the other reasons for my disquiet were my awareness of its implicantions. And this was back in 1997-98.
Firstly, it was against the traditional common law approach, which I thought was fair, sensible and an efficient use of resources. If it ain’t broke, don’t fix it. This was one of those things.
Secondly, it practically resulted in a new legal standard, the hypothetical beyond reasonable doubt (HBRD), which was unknown in any other jurisdiction in the world. BRD because that was the standard the prosecution had to meet at the prima facie stage. Hypothetical because, practically, how can we truly arrive at BRD before hearing the other side? Hence, HBRD.
We can only say we have BRD after we hear both sides. BRD is not a standard of compliance that applies throughout the trial. It is the level of confidence the judge needs to have after considering the evidence and arguments in totality, before he can convict an accused. I convict him because the quality of evidence is beyond a reasonable doubt that he committed the offence.
Third, and more importantly, raising doubt at the defence stage is near impossible. How is the court supposed to find any reasonable doubt arising at the defence stage if it had determined at the prima facie stage that the offence had been proven BRD? If Arulpragasan Sandaraju made it more challenging for the prosecution to establish a case at the prima facie stage, it made it near impossible for the defence to be acquitted by raising a reasonable doubt.
Fourthly, and as a result, in this approach, practically, the accused is now obliged to prove his defence at the defence stage instead of merely raising a reasonable doubt. To remain silent and offer no evidence is the equivalent to pleading guilty because the prosecution has already proven the charge against you BRD. This completely undermines the presumption of innocence, which applies until the judge declares her judgment.
This is why soon after Arulpragasan Sandaraju was decided, on 27 July 1996, the government moved quickly to amend section 180 CPC.. It added the sections 180(1), (2) and (3). The amendment was gazetted on 30.1.1997 and took effect on 31.1.1997. Arulpragasan Sandaraju stood for only 6 months and 5 days before it was corrected by legislation.
The revision of section 180 CPC was meant to send a strong signal to the judiciary that the standard they were expected to follow was Hua Tua Tau. That was why the phrase prima facie was stipulated in each sub-section. Section 182A CPC was inserted to reinforce this understanding by prescribing BRD at the conclusion of the trial.
Regrettably, the judiciary did not get the message. Instead, in the subsequent decision Balachandran v Public Prosecutor [2005] 2 MLJ 3301, the Federal Court merely considered the revised section 180 and new 182A CPC in arriving at a watered down version of Arulpragasan Sandaraju or preserved its spirit if not name, whichever way we want to look at it. Haw Tua Tau and the traditional common law approach were not referred to or discussed.
The Federal Court required courts to ‘undertake a positive evaluation of the credibility and reliabitliy of all the evidence adduced so as to determine whether the elements of the offence have been established.’ Further, ‘As the accused can be convicted on the prima facie evidence, it must have reached a standard which is capable of supporting a conviction beyond reasoanble doubt.’ I have highlighted both these quotes because these sum up the court’s approach to prima facie these days.
Not long after, in PP v Mohd Radzi Abu Bakar [2006] 1 CLJ 457, the Federal Court decided on 25.11.2005 arrived at the same conclusion, without referring to Balachandran. It reiterated the need to conduct a maximum evaluation and a qualitative assessment of the evidence to ensure that it is credible and reliable at the prima facie stage. The prosecution’s evidence must be strong enough to sustain a conviction if left unrebutted. The test it is not a hypothetical one at the prima facie stage. It was an evidential one, which the court had to be confident about. The Federal Court continued its tortured reasoning to avoid using the word BRD for the prima facie stage but really, that’s what it practically amounted to. These finer, nuanced matters are lost in the daily grind of court practice, like dew drops evaporating in the morning heat
What the Federal Court did in Balachandran and Mohd Radzi Abu Bakar was a return to the watered down Arulpragasan Sandaraju position with slight refinement, i.e., prosecution is expected to prove the case BRD at the prima facie stage, but we will not call it BRD or HBRD, and the court is expected to conduct a maximum evaluation over the evidence. This is conceptually messed up.
The problem with this approach is that one cannot claim to conduct a maximum evaluation without applying the standard of BRD. You cannot say this because it is logically inconsistent. To conduct a maximum evaluation is to necessarily evaluate it to the level of HBRD. We cannot conduct a maximum evaluation without specifying a standard the evaluation is supposed to reach. This is the fallacy of the Arulpragasan-Balachandran- Mohd Radzi Abu Bakar approach – of insisting on a maximum evaluation at the prima facie stage.
The government realised this and soon after Mohd Radzi Abu Bakar, it amended section 180 CPC again to include the present section 180(4):
(4) For the purpose of this section, a prima facie case is made out against the accused where the prosecution has adduced credible evidence proving each ingredient of the offence which if unrebutted or unexplained would warrant a conviction. [Emphasis mine]
With the presence of the bold phrase above, the government sent another strong message that the prima facie stage test was meant to follow the Haw Tua Tau position. The words ‘which if unrebutted or unexplained...’ was supposed to return the prima facie stage test to a hypothetical footing notwithstanding the phrase ‘the prosecution has adduced credible evidence proving each ingredient of the offence…’ The placement of this phrase at the end of the sentence was intended to make this clear.
Despite all that, the judiciary still refused to return to Haw Tua Tau. The next time the Federal Court had occasion to consider the prima facie stage test in Ahmad Najib Aris v PP [2009] 2 CLJ 800 on 27.3.2009), it regrettably referred and implicitly endorsed the approach in Balachandran (see paragraph [51], page 837 of Ahmad Najib Aris). In the subsequent Federal Court case of Lee Kwan Woh v PP [2009] 5 CLJ 631, despite not referring to Ahmad Najib Aris, held that the correct approach at the prima facie stage was Balachandran-Mohd Radzi Abu Bakar approach. Subsequent Federal Court cases simply reiterate this position: Abdullah Atan v PP & Other Appeals [2020] 9 CLJ 151 and Sathya Vello v PP [2022] 5 CLJ 659.
It is time to reconsider the application of the Balachandran-Mohd Radzi Abu Bakar approach (maximum evaluation), which is really the Arulpragasan Sandaraju approach and consider reinstating the Haw Tua Tau approach (minimum evaluation). The Balachandran-Mohd Radzi Abu Bakar approach is prejudicial to an accused person and raise greater challenges in conducting his defence.
Firstly, it renders the right to silence ineffective and irrelevant. This is clear from Ahmad Najib Aris where the court confirmed that an accused person that remains silent must be convicted.
Secondly, it makes it incredibly difficult to raise a reasonable doubt after the prima facie stage. After determining through maximum evaluation that the accused committed the offence at the prima facie stage, the court will be far less likely to find that a reasonable doubt has been raised in defence. The court will have to effectively concede it was wrong at the prima facie stage in upholding a defence.
From a psychologically perspective, the judge is not going to do that. She is likelier to decide in a way that is consistent with her previous ruling, which makes her less likely to contradict herself later. She is likelier to adopt confirmation bias to only look for supporting points to strengthen her previous opinion. I am not saying all judges do this, but behavioural science suggests these possibilities are real, and the approach creates conditions to encourage those possibilities.
Thirdly, the accused now has to prove his defence, on a balance of probabilities. He cannot keep quiet any more. He has to explain himself, and his explanation needs to be credible and supported by evidence. If not, the court is not going to believe him. If he keeps quiet, he will be convicted. This goes against the very fundamentals of a criminal trial in the Commonwealth.
I have sketched out the trajectory of developments to the prima facie stage test as I have known and experienced it. The purpose of this is to show that the Malaysian position is inconsistent with the rest of the Commonwealth, unfair, improperly motivated, and thoroughly against the basic principles of a criminal trial. For these reasons, it needs to be recalibrated and returned to the position in Haw Tua Tau.
Until that happens, there is potential for grave miscarriages of justice in criminal trials across Malaysia, as the basic principles of how a court is supposed to decide a criminal case—as summed up by Tun Suffian in Mat v PP—cannot function, which is as follows:
The position may be conveniently stated as follows:
(a) If you are satisfied beyond reasonable doubt as to the accused’s guilt- Convict.
(b) If you accept or believe the accused’s explanation – Acquit.
(c) If you do not accept or believe the accused’s explanation – Do not convict but consider the next steps below:
(d) If you do not accept or believe the accused’s explanation and that explanation does not raise in your mind a reasonable doubt as to his guilt – Convict
(e) If you do not accept or believe the accused’s explanation but nevertheless it raises in your mind a reasonable doubt as to his guilt – Acquit
Under the Balachandran-Mohd Radzi approach, (e) will never happen. This situation can be rectified in two ways. It can be by way of a re-interpretation of section 180 CPC by the Federal Court. Or it can happen legislatively as insightfully proposed by Edward Lee in his thoughtful essay, Is there a Right to Silence in Malaysia? Or both. Whatever the method, what’s clear is, it’s time for a change.
P/S I have attached a scanned copy of a badly photocopied version of Syed Ahmad Idid’s UTJ Notes for your reading (dis)pleasure. It gives an insider’s partial view of the Judiciary during the Eusoffe Chin days. Essential reading.
From the Blog
Recalibrating the Malaysian Prima Facie Test
Share on
In mid-1997, after starting the Certificate of Legal Practice (CLP) course at the University of Malaya, I ran up against one of my earliest frustrations with the criminal legal procedure in Malaysia: the prima facie stage of a criminal trial.
The saga begins with an interpretation of the previous incarnation of section 180 of the Criminal Procedure Code (CPC), titled Procedure after conclusion of case for prosecution, which read as follows:
Until 1996, the landmark case laying down the interpretation of section 180 PC was Haw Tua Tau v PP [1983] 1 CLJ (Rep) 11. It was decided by the Privy Council from a case emanating from Singapore. Haw Tua Tau essentially affirmed that notwithstanding amendments to the CPC, the prima facie stage test followed the traditional common law approach.
In Haw Tua Tau, the Court confirmed that the test at the prima facie stage was hypothetical. The judge should ask if the prosecution’s evidence was accepted as true, would it establish each essential element of the charge? It more a question of law and fact, but with more law than fact. Consequentially, at the prima facie stage, the judge is supposed to take a minimum evaluation of the evidence. At this stage, the judge does not need to be convinced that the evidence proves beyond a reasonable doubt that the accused is committed the offence.
Instead, the judge must determine whether there is some evidence that, if believed, would warrant a conviction. That hypothetical belief can be dispensed with if the evidence is inherently incredible—that is, not credible to the point that its very description defies belief. For example, a witness testified he saw the accused enter an apartment on the twentieth floor through its window and was deposited there by a twenty-story tall fire-breathing monster.
The court decides whether the prosecution has proven the charge beyond a reasonable doubt only after the defence is called and heard. Until then, the judge must keep an open mind. Practically, she is supposed only to make up her mind after she has heard the evidence and read arguments from the respective parties.
The Privy Council in Haw Tua Tau summed up the traditional common law approach to the standard of proof at the close of the prosecution’s case, an approach followed by the rest of the Commonwealth.
The Federal Court, in the decision of Arulpragasan Sandaraju v Public Prosecutor [1996] 4 CLJ 597, however, decisively rejected Haw Tua Tau and, with that, the traditional common law approach. It affirmed exactly what the Privy Council rejected: that the prosecution must prove its case beyond a reasonable doubt (BRD) at the prima facie stage. It held that the court must undertake a maximum evaluation of the prosecution’s evidence at the prima facie stage. That same high standard of proof is applied throughout the trial.
I could understand why the local criminal lawyers were arguing for this to be the position—it placed a much heavier burden on the prosecution to prove its case BRD at an intermediate stage. The logic is that since the prosecution is made weightier during its phase of the case, the defence is less likely to be called.
Having read, considered, and synthesised all the important decisions about the test at the prima facie stage, beginning with Haw Tua Tau and ending with Arulpragasan Sandaraju, I accumulated a deep disquiet with how we ended up with the latter case, which I thoroughly disagreed with.
That disquiet was informed by Tuan Syed Ahmad Idid Syed Abdullah Idid infamous Understanding the Judiciary Notes, specifically UTJ Note No. 13. In this note he wrote about the late Edgar Joseph Jr and in his second paragraph this is what he wrote:
How true his statement is, I don’t know. However, having read the important Supreme Court and Federal Court decisions leading up to Arulpragasan Sandaraju, his observations about there being a schism between Tan Sri Azmi and Tan Sri Edgard Joseph is not without basis. The clear difference in approach, attitude and frustrations between them was palpable from their judgments. Also, Tuan Syed Ahmad Idid’s observation about the other Commonwealth countries not following Arulpragasan Sandaraju is correct.
Aside from the genesis of the change in law from Haw Tua Tau to Arulpragasan Sandaraju, the other reasons for my disquiet were my awareness of its implicantions. And this was back in 1997-98.
Firstly, it was against the traditional common law approach, which I thought was fair, sensible and an efficient use of resources. If it ain’t broke, don’t fix it. This was one of those things.
Secondly, it practically resulted in a new legal standard, the hypothetical beyond reasonable doubt (HBRD), which was unknown in any other jurisdiction in the world. BRD because that was the standard the prosecution had to meet at the prima facie stage. Hypothetical because, practically, how can we truly arrive at BRD before hearing the other side? Hence, HBRD.
We can only say we have BRD after we hear both sides. BRD is not a standard of compliance that applies throughout the trial. It is the level of confidence the judge needs to have after considering the evidence and arguments in totality, before he can convict an accused. I convict him because the quality of evidence is beyond a reasonable doubt that he committed the offence.
Third, and more importantly, raising doubt at the defence stage is near impossible. How is the court supposed to find any reasonable doubt arising at the defence stage if it had determined at the prima facie stage that the offence had been proven BRD? If Arulpragasan Sandaraju made it more challenging for the prosecution to establish a case at the prima facie stage, it made it near impossible for the defence to be acquitted by raising a reasonable doubt.
Fourthly, and as a result, in this approach, practically, the accused is now obliged to prove his defence at the defence stage instead of merely raising a reasonable doubt. To remain silent and offer no evidence is the equivalent to pleading guilty because the prosecution has already proven the charge against you BRD. This completely undermines the presumption of innocence, which applies until the judge declares her judgment.
This is why soon after Arulpragasan Sandaraju was decided, on 27 July 1996, the government moved quickly to amend section 180 CPC.. It added the sections 180(1), (2) and (3). The amendment was gazetted on 30.1.1997 and took effect on 31.1.1997. Arulpragasan Sandaraju stood for only 6 months and 5 days before it was corrected by legislation.
The revision of section 180 CPC was meant to send a strong signal to the judiciary that the standard they were expected to follow was Hua Tua Tau. That was why the phrase prima facie was stipulated in each sub-section. Section 182A CPC was inserted to reinforce this understanding by prescribing BRD at the conclusion of the trial.
Regrettably, the judiciary did not get the message. Instead, in the subsequent decision Balachandran v Public Prosecutor [2005] 2 MLJ 3301, the Federal Court merely considered the revised section 180 and new 182A CPC in arriving at a watered down version of Arulpragasan Sandaraju or preserved its spirit if not name, whichever way we want to look at it. Haw Tua Tau and the traditional common law approach were not referred to or discussed.
The Federal Court required courts to ‘undertake a positive evaluation of the credibility and reliabitliy of all the evidence adduced so as to determine whether the elements of the offence have been established.’ Further, ‘As the accused can be convicted on the prima facie evidence, it must have reached a standard which is capable of supporting a conviction beyond reasoanble doubt.’ I have highlighted both these quotes because these sum up the court’s approach to prima facie these days.
Not long after, in PP v Mohd Radzi Abu Bakar [2006] 1 CLJ 457, the Federal Court decided on 25.11.2005 arrived at the same conclusion, without referring to Balachandran. It reiterated the need to conduct a maximum evaluation and a qualitative assessment of the evidence to ensure that it is credible and reliable at the prima facie stage. The prosecution’s evidence must be strong enough to sustain a conviction if left unrebutted. The test it is not a hypothetical one at the prima facie stage. It was an evidential one, which the court had to be confident about. The Federal Court continued its tortured reasoning to avoid using the word BRD for the prima facie stage but really, that’s what it practically amounted to. These finer, nuanced matters are lost in the daily grind of court practice, like dew drops evaporating in the morning heat
What the Federal Court did in Balachandran and Mohd Radzi Abu Bakar was a return to the watered down Arulpragasan Sandaraju position with slight refinement, i.e., prosecution is expected to prove the case BRD at the prima facie stage, but we will not call it BRD or HBRD, and the court is expected to conduct a maximum evaluation over the evidence. This is conceptually messed up.
The problem with this approach is that one cannot claim to conduct a maximum evaluation without applying the standard of BRD. You cannot say this because it is logically inconsistent. To conduct a maximum evaluation is to necessarily evaluate it to the level of HBRD. We cannot conduct a maximum evaluation without specifying a standard the evaluation is supposed to reach. This is the fallacy of the Arulpragasan-Balachandran- Mohd Radzi Abu Bakar approach – of insisting on a maximum evaluation at the prima facie stage.
The government realised this and soon after Mohd Radzi Abu Bakar, it amended section 180 CPC again to include the present section 180(4):
With the presence of the bold phrase above, the government sent another strong message that the prima facie stage test was meant to follow the Haw Tua Tau position. The words ‘which if unrebutted or unexplained...’ was supposed to return the prima facie stage test to a hypothetical footing notwithstanding the phrase ‘the prosecution has adduced credible evidence proving each ingredient of the offence…’ The placement of this phrase at the end of the sentence was intended to make this clear.
Despite all that, the judiciary still refused to return to Haw Tua Tau. The next time the Federal Court had occasion to consider the prima facie stage test in Ahmad Najib Aris v PP [2009] 2 CLJ 800 on 27.3.2009), it regrettably referred and implicitly endorsed the approach in Balachandran (see paragraph [51], page 837 of Ahmad Najib Aris). In the subsequent Federal Court case of Lee Kwan Woh v PP [2009] 5 CLJ 631, despite not referring to Ahmad Najib Aris, held that the correct approach at the prima facie stage was Balachandran-Mohd Radzi Abu Bakar approach. Subsequent Federal Court cases simply reiterate this position: Abdullah Atan v PP & Other Appeals [2020] 9 CLJ 151 and Sathya Vello v PP [2022] 5 CLJ 659.
It is time to reconsider the application of the Balachandran-Mohd Radzi Abu Bakar approach (maximum evaluation), which is really the Arulpragasan Sandaraju approach and consider reinstating the Haw Tua Tau approach (minimum evaluation). The Balachandran-Mohd Radzi Abu Bakar approach is prejudicial to an accused person and raise greater challenges in conducting his defence.
Firstly, it renders the right to silence ineffective and irrelevant. This is clear from Ahmad Najib Aris where the court confirmed that an accused person that remains silent must be convicted.
Secondly, it makes it incredibly difficult to raise a reasonable doubt after the prima facie stage. After determining through maximum evaluation that the accused committed the offence at the prima facie stage, the court will be far less likely to find that a reasonable doubt has been raised in defence. The court will have to effectively concede it was wrong at the prima facie stage in upholding a defence.
From a psychologically perspective, the judge is not going to do that. She is likelier to decide in a way that is consistent with her previous ruling, which makes her less likely to contradict herself later. She is likelier to adopt confirmation bias to only look for supporting points to strengthen her previous opinion. I am not saying all judges do this, but behavioural science suggests these possibilities are real, and the approach creates conditions to encourage those possibilities.
Thirdly, the accused now has to prove his defence, on a balance of probabilities. He cannot keep quiet any more. He has to explain himself, and his explanation needs to be credible and supported by evidence. If not, the court is not going to believe him. If he keeps quiet, he will be convicted. This goes against the very fundamentals of a criminal trial in the Commonwealth.
I have sketched out the trajectory of developments to the prima facie stage test as I have known and experienced it. The purpose of this is to show that the Malaysian position is inconsistent with the rest of the Commonwealth, unfair, improperly motivated, and thoroughly against the basic principles of a criminal trial. For these reasons, it needs to be recalibrated and returned to the position in Haw Tua Tau.
Until that happens, there is potential for grave miscarriages of justice in criminal trials across Malaysia, as the basic principles of how a court is supposed to decide a criminal case—as summed up by Tun Suffian in Mat v PP—cannot function, which is as follows:
Under the Balachandran-Mohd Radzi approach, (e) will never happen. This situation can be rectified in two ways. It can be by way of a re-interpretation of section 180 CPC by the Federal Court. Or it can happen legislatively as insightfully proposed by Edward Lee in his thoughtful essay, Is there a Right to Silence in Malaysia? Or both. Whatever the method, what’s clear is, it’s time for a change.
P/S I have attached a scanned copy of a badly photocopied version of Syed Ahmad Idid’s UTJ Notes for your reading (dis)pleasure. It gives an insider’s partial view of the Judiciary during the Eusoffe Chin days. Essential reading.
Related Posts
Jun Kit was recommended to me by a friend who saw my call out for…
I followed Zee Tan's work on Facebook before I got around to approaching him for…
My experience of calls to the Bar is one borne from moving calls mostly at…
From The Atelier Gerald Chong was commissioned for this piece after he saw my call…
From the Atelier Razie Alfiedan was commissioned for this piece. He wrote in after he…
Share on
From the Blog
Recommended Readings
A Legal Aid Defence Experts Panel
Recalibrating the Malaysian Prima Facie Test
Rethinking the Written, Oral Submissions and Approach to Hearings
The Natural Limits of Freedom of Expression
Taxation of Costs
Article 3(1) of the Federal Constitution from 3 Dimensions
Experience the art pieces
up close and personal.
Ol’Skool Smokehouse here. Visit us to savor them in person.